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Abstract 
This paper investigates what prices, the consumer price or the producer one, 
should be targeted by a central bank when the government increases the tax 
rate on the consumption goods, i.e. Value added tax (VAT). We compare with 
two policies using New-Keynesian DSGE model with the producer price 
stickiness. We see that the producer price, which means the price without 
tax, targeting better off when the producer price is flexible and the VAT 
increase shock is less persistency. On the other hand, consumer price target 
which includes the tax may be better off when the producer price is sticky or 
the VAT increase shock is quite persistency. 
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1. Introduction 
Taxing on the consumption goods, namely the consumption tax or value 
added tax (VAT), accepts a lot of countries. Recently, several countries, which 
face the sovereign problem, raise its tax rate. For example, Greece raised the 
VAT rate from 18% to 23% in 2015, and Italy also raised it from 21% to 23% 
in 2012. Increasing tax rate on consumption causes decline in the 
consumption and output and increase in the consumer price. In this case, the 
monetary authorities face the difficult situation of the trade-off between 
stabilizing the output and the inflation rate. In fact, the monetary policy 
treatments under the VAT increase are various. Figure 1 and 2 show that the 
Bank of Japan (BOJ) and Bank of England (BOE) take the different policy 
stance to each case in VAT (or consumption tax rate) increase. For example, 
the BOJ increased the official bank rate from 2.5% to 3% in April 1989 that 
the consumption tax induces and set its rate as 3%. On the other hand, the 
BOJ cut lower the official bank rate from 12.375% to 11.875% in January 
1991, the VAT increases from 15% to 17.5%.  
This paper investigates which consumer price index (CPI) or producer price 
index (PPI) should be targeted by a central bank when the government 
increases the tax rate on the consumption goods. Concretely, this paper 
compares with CPI which includes the component of value added tax (VAT) 
and PPI which does not include it. To compare with two policies, we use the 
New Keynesian DSGE model with consumption tax. Introducing the 
consumption tax, we can compare with the consumer price, which includes 
the tax and the producer price; i.e. the price without tax. We obtain two 
remarkable results. First, the economy under both the consumer and the 
producer price targeting follow the resemble response after tax increase. On 
the other hand, these are qualitative and quantitative difference of 
responses of output and inflation rate. Second, comparing with two monetary 
policies with respect to welfare, order between them is not monotonic. 
Concretely, the producer price targeting is better off, if the producer price is 
flexible and the persistency of VAT increase shock is low.  
There are several related literatures about the effect of consumption tax in 
DSGE model and investigation about the inflation rate of the Taylor rule. As 
for the consumption tax increase in DSGE model, we refer to Forni et al. 
(2009) and Iwata (2011) which use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) based 
Taylor rule. As for the consideration about the inflation in Taylor rule, Aoki 
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(2001) considers about multi sector model which compose flexible price sector 
and sticky price one, and show that the optimal monetary policy is to target 
sticky price inflation. Benigno (2004), Bernanke and Woodford (2000), 
Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2007) and Okano (2007) analyze the optimal 
inflation target in New Keynesian open-economy macroeconomics2. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the DSGE 
model with consumption tax. In Section 3, we analysis the model under 
unanticipated tax increase and Section 4 expands the case in anticipated tax 
increase. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
In this model, we construct the DSGE model with ad-valorem taxes. This 
paper sets the sticky price DSGE model a la Calvo (1983) and we do not 
include physical capital. Similar to prototype DSGE model, the intermediate 
firm faces a monopolistic competition and can change the producer price with 
probability 1 − ρ , while remain its price with probability ρ . The 
government distributes the lump-sum transfer finance by both unit and 
ad-valorem tax. That is, increase in unit or ad-valorem tax occur only the 
substitution effect. For simplicity, we assume that the inflation rate at the 
steady state sets zero. We set the lifetime utility is a separable function as 
follow: 
,
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where θ is the demand elasticity to price, and 
1

 is the markup. 
We consider a prototype DSGE model with consumption tax and transfer 
from the government to the households3. 
                                                   
2 Bernanke and Woodford (2000) shows the producer price inflation target is better 
under the assumption that purchasing power parity applies. While Okano (2007) shows 
that the consumer price inflation target is better under the assumption that the pricing 
to market applies. 
3 We explain the detail of the model in Appendix. 
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where tyˆ  is the output gap, tC ,ˆ  is the inflation rate of the consumer price 
(i.e. tax including price) deviated from the steady state, tP ,ˆ  is the inflation 
rate of the consumer price (i.e. tax including price) deviated from the steady 
state, σ is the relative risk aversion, λ is the inverse of the Frisch labor 
supply, β is the discount factor, ρ is the probability of remaining price, ˆ  
is the consumption tax rate, iˆ  is the policy rate, y and   is the 
parameter of the Taylor rule, and t  is an anticipated consumption tax 
shock. 
 Eq. (1) represents the New-Keynesian IS (NKIS) curve. Eq. (2) represents 
the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). Eq. (3) defines the relationship 
between the consumer price and the producer price. Eq. (4) represents the 
Taylor rule, which considers about the inflation target with respect to the 
price level; the consumer price or the producer one. Eq. (5) represents the 
law of motion of the VAT rate which assumes AR (1) process, ω is the 
persistency parameter and ε is the tax shock.  
 
3. Analysis of the model 
We discuss about the comparison with the two price targets when the 
unanticipated VAT increase causes. That is, consumers and firms know the 
tax rate increase in period 1 and cannot in previous period. 
 
3.1. The Producer Price target 
First, we consider about the case in the producer price target. That is, we 
define the Taylor rule as follow: 
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Substituting above the Taylor rule to Eq. (1), we can obtain the following 
equation: 
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Using guess and verify method, we obtain the solution of the model at 
period t=2 and later as follows: 
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this case, we obtain the same policy function at the period t=1, since the 
NKIS curve at period 1 is same as that at period t≧2. There is remarkable 
feature about the response of PPI. Eq .(8) shows that the PPI inflation rate 
increases if   0
1
2
1 
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

 y . Although it is different from the result of partial 
analysis, it may be consistent with the actual data shown in Figure 3. 
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3.2. Consumer Price Target 
We consider about the case in the producer price target. That is, we define 
the Taylor rule as follow: 
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Similar to the previous subsection, we use the guess and verify method to 
solve the policy function of output and two inflation rates at period t≧2 as 
follows:  
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On the policy functions at period 1 are induced as follow: 
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Eq. (11), (12), (13), (14), (15) and (16) explain that the dynamic processes of 
output and inflation rate follow the policy functions in Eq. (11), (12) and (13), 
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except for the case in period 1 shown in Eq. (14), (15) and (16). 
 
3.3. Welfare Comparison 
Similar to Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), a second order approximation to 
the welfare function (equal to the household’s utility function) around the 
steady state: 
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 We substitute Eq. (11) ,(12), (13), (14), (15) and (16) to Eq. (17) to compare 
with the two policy targets under VAT increase. 
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where PTU ,0  is the welfare under producer price target, and CTU ,0  is that under 
consumer price target. 
 
First and second terms of parenthesis of the right hand side represent the 
inflation volatility in each price target, and third (and fourth in Eq. (19)) 
term are the output volatility.  
 
3.4. Numerical Example 
In this subsection, we make the numerical example to investigate which 
policy is better off using somewhat valid parameter values. We show the 
benchmark parameter in Table 15. Figure 4 and 5 show the impulse response 
                                                   
5 We refer to some calibrated or estimated parameters (e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003, 
2007), Sugo and Ueda (2007), Iwata (2011) etc.) when we decide to these parameters 
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of output and each inflation rate to unanticipated VAT increase shock at 
period 1. Shown in Figure 4 and 5, the responses of output are qualitatively 
different and that of PPI target is less volatile than that of CPI target, while 
there is little difference among CPI and PPI targets. Figure 5 shows the 
welfare comparison with two monetary policy stances and PPI target is 
dominated to CPI target in benchmark parameters. In Figure 5, we see two 
remarkable points. First, the producer price target is usually better off. This 
result may be similar to the result of Aoki (2001). Aoki (2001) shows the 
optimal monetary policy in multi-sector model focuses on the sector that 
faces on the price stickiness6. Second, the CPI targeting rule is better off 
when the producer price is sticky or (and) the persistency of tax shock is high. 
Figure 6, 7, 8 and 9 show the initial responses of output and CPI inflation 
which affect the welfare in each ρ and ω. Especially, the higher ρ is, the 
better the CPI targeting is because the output volatility of CPI targeting is 
much less than that of PPI targeting. As for the persistency of VAT shock ω, 
it affects the relative price between CPI and PPI change at period t≧2. 
Shown in Eq. (3), CPI is smaller than PPI7. 
 
4. Extension to the anticipated VAT increase 
In this section, we extend to the case in more realistic case; i.e. the 
anticipated VAT increase. We represent the anticipated VAT shock t as 
follow: 
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In this case, we take an anticipated VAT shock at period 0; i.e. 10  . Then , 
we rewrite the NKIS and NKPC at period 0 as follows8: 
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(Especially, we refer to Iwata (2011) with respect to seminal parameters ω and ρ). 
Although this case is merely numerical example, the result in this paper is not so far 
from the realistic. 
6 We need to pay attention to the difference of the definition of the CPI. Aoki (2001) 
define CPI as composite of flexible and sticky producer goods. 
7 As for σ and λ, there is no quantitative difference from benchmark setting even if 
we change them as other reasonable parameter values. 
8 As for the unanticipated shock, there is no deviation from the steady state at the 
period 0; i.e. 0ˆˆˆˆ 1,00,100  PP EyEy  . 
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where    1y , yy 1ˆ (if PPI rule), or y (CPI rule), 
π 1,ˆP (if PPI rule), or 1 (CPI rule). 
Substituting Eq. (14)-(17) to Eq. (12), we obtain the welfare under PPI and 
CPI target equation as following two equations: 
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























     (24) 
 
 
 
   
 
,ˆ
1
ˆ
1
1
11
ˆ
2
2
2
222
2
1,
2
0
2
2
1
222
1,
11
2
0,
,0 t
y
y
P
C
CT
y
yU
U 



















































    (25) 
Using Eq. (20), (21), (22) and (23), we obtain the impulse responses of output 
and inflation rate to anticipated VAT increase shock shown in Figure 11 and 
12. Figure 11 and 12 show that the quantitative difference between CPI and 
PPI targets does not cause well. As a result, the result of the welfare 
comparison is similar to the case in unanticipated shock9. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates which prices, i.e. consumer or producer price should 
                                                   
9 Actually, welfare comparison with two monetary policy under anticipated VAT shock 
is almost same in Figure 5. 
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be targeted by a central bank when the government increases the tax rate on 
the consumption goods. To compare with two policies, we use the New 
Keynesian DSGE model with consumption tax. Introducing the consumption 
tax, the difference among the consumer price and the producer one causes. 
We obtain two remarkable results. First, the economy under both the 
consumer and the producer price targeting follow the resemble response 
after tax increase. On the other hand, these are qualitative and quantitative 
difference of responses of output and inflation rate. Second, comparing with 
two monetary policies with respect to welfare, order between them is not 
monotonic. Concretely, the producer price targeting is better off, if the 
producer price is flexible or very sticky.   
There are several extensions of this paper. For example, we apply the richer 
DSGE model, such as introducing capital, consumption externality, wage 
rigidity etc. In addition, we may analyze the optimal consumption tax in 
DSGE model. These possibilities are to be addressed in future researches. 
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Appendix: Derivation of the model 
 
A.1. The Households 
Lifetime utility of the representative households is a separable function of 
his or her consumption index𝑐𝑡, which consists of each goods 𝑐𝑗,𝑡 where j ∈
(0,1) and labor 𝑙𝑡 given by: 
,
110
11
0











t
ttt lcE



                        (A.1) 
,
11
0
1
,







 




djcc tjt  
where θ is the demand elasticity to price, and 
1

 is the price markup. 
The nominal flow budget constraint is given by: 
  ,1 ,11 tttCttttt BcPVBilW                      (A.2) 
where the consumer price index is   tPttC PP ,, 1  , tPP ,  is the producer price 
index. 
First, we reset the utility maximization problem to cost minimization 
problem as follow: 
 
,0..
min
11
0
1
,
1
0
,,,
,














djccts
cp
tjt
tjtjC
c th
　
                 (A.3) 
where tjCp ,,  is the consumer price of good j which is equal to   tjPt p ,,1  . 
We obtain the following equations w.r.t. the consumer price index tCP ,  and 
𝑐𝑗,𝑡; 
,
1
1
1
0
1
, ,,










  djpP tjCtC                       (A.4) 
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.
,
,,
, t
tC
tjC
tj c
P
p
c









                              (A.5) 
Next, using Lagrangean which maximizes (A.1) subjected to (A.2), we obtain 
the following equations: 
,  tt c                            (A.6) 
,
,

t
tC
tt l
P
W
                               (A.7) 
  ,1
,1,
1
tC
t
tC
t
t
PP
i

 










                        (A.8) 
Where t  is the Lagrange multiplier of (A.2). 
 
A.2. The firms 
The production technology of firm j is given by: 
.,, tjtj ly                            (A.9) 
The firm j minimizes the real term of total cost 
tC
t
P
W
,
. Therefore, we can 
obtain following condition: 
,
,
t
tC
t
t mc
P
W
                          (A.10) 
where tmc  is the real marginal cost. 
 Each firm j can reset the producer price tjpp ,,  with probability 1 − ρ. 
Then, the firm j which can reset his price sets tjPp ,,
~  to maximize the present 
value of profit as follow: 
    ,1 ,
0 0
,,,
1
ktj
i
i
k
ktktCtjPkt
i
t ymcPpiE 

 


             (A.11) 
Substituting (A.5) and resource constraint 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑙𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 to (A.8),  
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   
 
  tktP
tjP
i
i
k
kt
ktPkt
tjP
ktCkt
i
t
t
tC
tjC
i
i
k
ktktCtjPkt
i
t
y
P
p
mc
P
p
PiE
y
P
p
mcPpiE








 







 































 
 
,
,,
0 0 ,
,,
,
1
,
,,
0 0
,,,
1
1
1
1
      (A.12) 
Substituting (A.8) to (A.12),  
  


































0 ,
,,
1
,
,,
, ,
~~
1
1
1
i ktP
tjP
kt
ktP
tjP
kt
ii
tttCt
P
p
mc
P
p
EyP


             (A.13) 
Differentiating (A.13) to tjpp ,,
~ , 
   
 
  
 
.
1
11
~
1
1
~
,0
~
1
~
1
0
,,
0
,,
,,
0
,
0
1
,,,
0 ,
1
,,
1
,
,,
,


















 



















i
tPitP
ii
i
tPitPitkt
ii
tt
tjP
i
itPitkt
ii
i
itP
ii
tjp
i itP
tjP
ktkt
itP
tjPii
ttC
PP
PPmc
P
p
PmcPp
P
p
mc
P
p
yP














          (A.14) 
We define 





 
0
,,
0
,, ,
i
tPitP
ii
t
i
tPitPit
ii
t PPZPPmcF  , we obtain the 
following equations: 
  ,1 1
,
1,


 







 t
tP
tP
tktt F
P
P
mcF

                 (A.15) 
,1 1
,
1,










 t
tP
tP
t Z
P
P
Z

                   (A.16) 
.
1
~
,
,,
t
t
tP
tjP
Z
F
P
p




                         (A.17) 
Using the probability ρ, we rewrite (A.4) as follow: 
  .~1 11
11
1
1
1
0
1
,
1
1
1
0
1
, ,,,,





 


















 
ttt
tPtC
PpP
djpPdjpP
tjPtjC              (A.18) 
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A.3. Monetary Policy 
The central government sets a policy interest rate following the Taylor rule: 
),(,ˆˆˆ , PCjyi tjtyt  　　   
In this paper, we compare with two price target of consumer and produce 
prices. 
 
A.4. The Government  
The government levies consumption tax and pay back to households as a 
lump-sum transfer 𝑉𝑡.  
., tttPt VcP   
 
A.5. The equilibrium conditions 
Using above equations and each inflation rate 
tP
tP
tP
tC
tC
tC
P
P
P
P
,
1,
1,
,
1,
1, ,



    and 
tjP
tjP
tjp
p
p
,,,
1,,
1,, ~
~
~ 
  , we obtain the equilibrium conditions as follow: 
,  tt ymc                          (A.19) 
  ,1 1,
1

 





tCt
t
t i
y
y


                       (A.20) 
 
,
1
1
~
,
,,
t
tt
tP
tjP
Z
F







                       (A.21) 
  ,1 11,  ttPttt FmcF
                 (A.22) 
,1 11,  ttPt ZZ
                    (A.23) 
  ,~1 1,
1
,
    tPtP                    (A.24) 
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We obtain the steady state values as follow: 
,1~ ,  jPCP   
,
1


i  
,
1
1

Z  
,
1

 
mc  
  
 
,
1
11




F  
 
.
1
1
1


 








 chy  
 
A.6. Log-linearized equilibrium 
Log-linearized around the steady state in (A.15), (A.16), (A.18), (A.19) and 
(A.20), we can obtain the following equations: 
  ,ˆˆ tt ycm                          (A.25) 
 ,ˆˆ1ˆˆ 1,1   tCttttt EiyEy 

                 (A.26) 
,ˆˆˆ
1
ˆ~ˆ
,, ttttPtP ZF 

 


                  (A.27) 
  ,~ˆ1ˆ ,, tPtP                          (A.28) 
   ,ˆˆˆ
1
ˆ1ˆ 1, 






 ttPttt FcmF 


           (A.29) 
  ,ˆˆ1ˆ 11,   ttPt ZZ                   (A.30) 
Substituting (A.29) and (A.30) to (A.27), 
 
 
1,,,
~ˆˆ
1
2
ˆ1ˆ~ˆ 


 tPtttPtP cm 


          (A.31) 
We eliminate tP,
~ˆ  using (A.28), 
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     
.ˆˆ
1
21
ˆ
11
ˆ
1,, 




 tPtttP cm 






       (A.32) 
 .ˆˆ
1
ˆˆ
1,, 

 tttptc 


                    (A.33) 
Substituting (A.25) to (A.32), 
  
 
  
.ˆˆ
1
21
ˆ
11
ˆ
1,, 




 tPtttP y 







  (A.34) 
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Table 1. Benchmark parameter 
 
β σ λ θ ω ρ y    τ 
0.99 1 1 4 0.5 0.43 0.5 1.5 0.08 
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Figure 1. Policy interest rate and consumption tax rate in Japan 
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Figure 2. Policy interest rate and VAT rate in U.K. 
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Figure 3. Growth rate (year on year) Consumer Price Index (CPI) and 
Producer Price Index (PPI) in Japan 
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Figure 4. Impulse response of output to VAT increase shock under PPI and 
CPI target 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Impulse response of CPI inflation rate to VAT increase shock under 
PPI and CPI target 
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Figure 6. Welfare Comparison with two (CPI vs. PPI) price target policies 
 
 
 
Note:  
Region painted by red is that of the CPI targeting dominance (i.e. 
PTCT UU ,0,0  ). 
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Figure 7. Impulse response of output at period 1 in each ρ 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Impulse response of CPI inflation rate at period 1 in each ρ 
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Figure 9. Impulse response of output to VAT increase shock under PPI and 
CPI target (ρ=0.99) 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Impulse response of CPI inflation rate to VAT increase shock 
under PPI and CPI target (ρ=0.99) 
 
 
 
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CPI
PPI
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CPI
PPI
26 
 
Figure 11. Impulse response of output to anticipated VAT increase shock 
under PPI and CPI target 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Impulse response of CPI inflation rate to anticipated VAT increase 
shock under PPI and CPI target 
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